The Ghost of Gun Laws Past
TL;DR:
The Supreme Court recently upheld the ATF's interpretation of the Gun Control Act (GCA) to cover certain weapons parts kits and unfinished receivers in Bondi v. Vanderstok (600 U.S. ___ (2025)). This means the so-called "ghost gun" rule lives—for now. But the Court's decision was based strictly on statutory interpretation, not the Second Amendment. While the rule may be valid under the GCA's text, the GCA itself may not survive scrutiny under the post-New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (597 U.S. 1 (2022)) framework, which demands a historical tradition of firearms regulation. The constitutional challenge wasn't before the Court this time, but it likely will be soon.
Background:
In 2022, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) issued a rule attempting to bring so-called ghost guns under federal regulation. These include weapons parts kits and partially complete frames or receivers that, with minimal effort or specialized equipment, can be assembled into functioning firearms. The rule was an attempt to modernize enforcement of the GCA, passed in 1968, by targeting how firearms are sold and built in the age of 3D printers and online kits.
The ATF's rule sparked immediate legal challenges, with opponents arguing the agency had exceeded the authority granted to it by Congress. The Fifth Circuit agreed. The Supreme Court disagreed.
A Brief Note on Rulemaking Authority:
Before getting into the procedural back-and-forth, it's worth pausing on how the ATF came to issue this rule in the first place. Like many federal agencies, the ATF relies on delegated rulemaking authority from Congress. That authority isn't limitless. As I discussed in a recent blog post about the FTC's non-compete ban, the Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (601 U.S. ___ (2024)) overturned the longstanding doctrine of Chevron deference. Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (467 U.S. 837 (1984)), courts previously deferred to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if the statute was ambiguous (which it usually was) and the agency’s interpretation was deemed reasonable (which courts usually did). That framework no longer applies. Agencies no longer get the benefit of the doubt when interpreting ambiguous statutes since interpreting legal meanings is precisely what courts are for.
This makes the Court's textualist approach in Vanderstok all the more significant. Rather than deferring to the ATF's interpretation of the GCA, the Court independently concluded that the rule fell within the statute—at least facially. Whether Congress had the constitutional authority to regulate in this way is a separate issue, but one worth keeping in mind.
Procedural History:
A group of plaintiffs, including manufacturers and purchasers of parts kits and unfinished receivers, sued to block the ATF's rule. The federal district court sided with them, issuing a vacatur of the rule. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the ATF went beyond its statutory authority under the GCA.
On appeal, the Supreme Court granted cert and reversed. The majority held that the ATF's interpretation did not facially contradict the text of the GCA.
Brief Exposition on the GCA:
The Gun Control Act of 1968 defines a "firearm" to include weapons that can be readily converted into operable firearms, as well as the "frame or receiver" of a weapon (18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)). It also requires serialization of firearms (18 U.S.C. § 923(i)) and imposes regulatory requirements on manufacturers, sellers, and purchasers. The GCA is a product of its time—responding to mid-20th century concerns about mail-order rifles and high-profile assassinations—but it remains the statutory backbone of modern federal firearms law.
What's a Ghost Gun?:
"Ghost gun" is a term favored by the media and regulators to describe firearms that lack serial numbers and are often assembled from kits or manufactured at home using unfinished receivers. The term carries a certain rhetorical weight, implying something sinister or invisible to the law. In practice, these are often legal firearms built by individuals for personal use—a practice that predates the existence of the federal government itself.
Brief Summary of the Vanderstok Holding:
The Supreme Court did not decide whether ghost guns should or shouldn't be regulated. It decided whether the ATF's rule was consistent with the GCA. Writing for the majority, Justice Gorsuch held that the statute’s language was broad enough to encompass some weapons parts kits and unfinished receivers—particularly when those items are easily converted into working firearms (see Vanderstok, slip op. at 10–11).
Importantly, the Court reached this conclusion without deferring to the ATF’s interpretation. In the opinion, the Court noted that “[t]he question is not whether ATF’s rule is reasonable, but whether the statute permits the rule’s scope” (id.). That approach reflects the post-Chevron reality articulated in Loper Bright: agencies don’t get a blank check, and courts must conduct an independent textual analysis. Here, the majority found the statute’s text to be broad enough on its own terms, not because the ATF said so.
The Court emphasized that this was a matter of statutory interpretation. It did not reach or consider any Second Amendment arguments, nor did it express a view on whether such regulation is wise or constitutional—only that it is permitted under the text of the GCA.
Why Vanderstok May Be Valid Under the GCA's Text, But Not Under a Bruen Analysis:
The modern Second Amendment framework doesn't rely on traditional interest-balancing. Instead, as clarified in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (597 U.S. 1, 19–20 (2022)), it follows a two-part structure. First, if a regulation implicates conduct covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment, it is presumed unconstitutional unless the government can demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation—primarily from the Founding to Reconstruction era. Second, if the regulation does not clearly touch on the Second Amendment's scope, it may be upheld unless the challenger shows that the arms in question (including items like magazines or even body armor) are in "common use" for lawful purposes, as recognized in District of Columbia v. Heller (554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008)).
Why SCOTUS Didn't Reach That 2A Analysis—But Why It Could (and Should) in the Future:
The GCA was enacted in 1968, long after the Founding and Reconstruction periods that anchor the Supreme Court’s historical-tradition test in Bruen. Many modern federal firearms regulations—serialization mandates, parts classifications, and certain possession restrictions—trace their origins to this statute. Because those regulatory concepts were largely unknown in 18th- and 19th-century America, they should not be presumed part of the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Under Step 1 of the Bruen analysis, if a challenged regulation implicates the plain text of the Second Amendment, the burden shifts to the government to justify it with historical precedent—not with policy justifications or post-1968 enactments.
Vanderstok wasn’t a Second Amendment case. It was a challenge to the scope of an agency’s authority under a federal statute. The plaintiffs did not frame their claims under Bruen, so the Court had no occasion to apply that standard. But the writing is on the wall. Since Bruen, multiple provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)—which lists categories of people prohibited from possessing firearms—have been challenged and sometimes struck down. Courts are increasingly applying Bruen to question whether federal gun laws match historical precedent.
If a future plaintiff brings a direct Second Amendment challenge to the serialization requirement or to the regulation of non-functional parts, the Court may have to answer the deeper question: not whether the ATF went too far, but whether Congress ever had the authority to go there in the first place. In my opinion, many of the regulations found in the GCA and state corollaries are unconstitutional under the first prong of the Bruen analysis.
Closing Thoughts:
The ATF rule survived—for now. But the next challenge may not be about administrative boundaries—it may be about the Constitution itself. And under Bruen, the GCA may be standing on historically shaky ground.
Contact Us:
If you have questions about the topics addressed in this article or another firearms-related legal matter, contact Wood Law Offices, PLLC through our website or by phone.
Disclaimer:
This blog post is for general informational purposes only and should not be construed as legal advice. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author. This content is considered attorney advertising and does not establish an attorney-client relationship. For specific legal advice tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney licensed in your jurisdiction.
Sources, For the Curious (or Skeptical):
- Bondi v. Vanderstok, 600 U.S. ___ (2025) – Supreme Court opinion PDF
- New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) – Supreme Court opinion
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) – Supreme Court opinion
- Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 601 U.S. ___ (2024) – Supreme Court opinion
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) – Justiasummary
© Wood Law Offices, PLLC. 2025. All rights reserved.
