It's Always Sunny in the Carolinas - Ep. 1

Adam Wood • April 11, 2025

Ep. 1 – What We Can Learn from “Reynolds v. Reynolds: The Cereal Defense”


TL;DR:

A mock trial (or more accurately, a mockery of a trial) in Paddy’s Pub over a car crash offers a surprisingly useful lesson in negligence, fault allocation, and civil defenses. This blog breaks down how courts in North and South Carolina would treat Frank’s impaired driving and Dennis’s distracted cereal-eating under real-world tort law.


Intro:

Learning about civil litigation rarely involves a deranged group of friends yelling about cereal and evolution in a mock courtroom set up in their bar—but maybe it should. This blog series looks at It’s Always Sunny in Philadelphia and pulls out the legal lessons buried underneath the absurdity. We start with a gem, one of my favorite episodes: Reynolds v. Reynolds: The Cereal Defense.


The Episode: Reynolds v. Reynolds: The Cereal Defense:


In Season 8, Episode 10, Frank—whose glasses needed new lenses—rear-ends Dennis, who was eating a bowl of cereal behind the wheel. Rather than take responsibility, Frank blames Dennis for the crash, claiming Dennis’s own carelessness was the sole cause of his damages. What ensues is a somewhat legally accurate but mostly unhinged trial to determine who's at fault.


As usual, the episode is chaotic. But beneath the theatrics lies a teachable moment about negligence, fault allocation, and how North Carolina and South Carolina would treat a real case like this.


Legal Analysis:


  • Negligence

To prevail in negligence, a plaintiff must show a duty of care, breach, causation, and damages. Frank clearly owed Dennis (and everyone else on the road) a duty to operate his vehicle safely. Driving with impaired vision and fiddling with a malfunctioning cassette player while on the road are textbook breaches of that duty.


North Carolina courts have addressed impaired vision before. In Davis v. Banks, 40 N.C. App. 415, 253 S.E.2d 417 (1979), evidence of impaired eyesight was admitted without prejudicing the plaintiff. In Cook v. Winston-Salem, 241 N.C. 422, 85 S.E.2d 696 (1955), a blind man’s failure to exercise heightened caution barred his recovery. White v. Dickerson, Inc., 248 N.C. 723, 104 S.E.2d 113 (1958), held that impaired vision must be supported by evidence.


South Carolina courts have taken similar positions. In Carrigg v. Cannon, 347 S.C. 75, 552 S.E.2d 767 (Ct. App. 2001), a decedent’s macular degeneration contributed to comparative fault. In Edwards v. Bloom, 246 S.C. 346, 143 S.E.2d 614 (1965), a driver blinded by sunlight was found contributorily negligent for continuing to drive. In Miller v. FerrellGas, L.P., 392 S.C. 295, 709 S.E.2d 85 (Ct. App. 2011), the court reaffirmed that drivers must slow or stop when their vision is impaired.


  • Contributory Negligence (NC)

North Carolina is one of the few states that follow the pure contributory negligence rule: if a plaintiff is even 1% at fault, recovery is barred. See Davis v. Hulsing Enters., LLC, 370 N.C. 455, 809 S.E.2d 320 (2018). 


One exception is the Last Clear Chance Doctrine, which allows a negligent plaintiff to recover if the defendant had the final opportunity to avoid the harm and failed to do so. The doctrine requires proof that (1) the plaintiff negligently put themselves in peril; (2) the defendant knew or should have known of the danger; (3) had the time and means to avoid it; (4) failed to do so; and (5) the injury resulted. See Presnell v. Payne, 272 N.C. 11, 157 S.E.2d 601 (1967); Outlaw v. Johnson, 190 N.C. App. 233, 660 S.E.2d 550 (2008). If Dennis could show that Frank had time to react and still chose to proceed blindly, he might escape the usual contributory negligence bar in North Carolina.


  • Comparative Fault (SC)

South Carolina uses modified comparative negligence. If the plaintiff is 50% or more at fault, recovery is barred. See Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991).


As noted above, impaired vision may weigh against Frank. But Dennis’s own behavior—eating a bowl of cereal while driving—would also be evaluated. A jury would determine each party’s share of fault. If Dennis were found to be 49% at fault, he could still recover 51% of his damages.


  • Assumption of Risk

To illustrate his point during trial, Dennis offers Frank a glass of wine then slaps his back, causing him to spill wine on his shirt. He then apologizes and says that was clearly his fault. Frank (with the help of judge/bailiff Mac), however, quickly asserts that he knew and assumed the risk of having wine spilled on his shirt when he accepted the drink. Frank’s wine-glass analogy—claiming Dennis assumed the risk by eating cereal behind the wheel—is a surprisingly accurate (if theatrical) reference to the assumption of risk defense.


In North Carolina, the doctrine is limited. In McWilliams v. Parham, 269 N.C. 162, 152 S.E.2d 117 (1967), and Gilreath v. Silverman, 245 N.C. 51, 95 S.E.2d 125 (1956), the court held that the defense generally requires a contractual or statutory relationship. In Fagundes v. Ammons Dev. Grp., 261 N.C. App. 138, 819 S.E.2d 436 (2018), the court held that assumption of risk must be proven with affirmative evidence and is usually a jury question. Statutory applications exist in contexts like roller skating (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99E-14), equine activities (§ 99E-2), and product liability (§ 99B-4).


South Carolina treats assumption of risk as part of its comparative fault framework. In Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime, 333 S.C. 71, 508 S.E.2d 565 (1998), the court held that assumption of risk no longer bars recovery entirely but is weighed with other fault. See also Cole v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co., 362 S.C. 445, 608 S.E.2d 459 (2005); McCune v. Myrtle Beach Indoor Shooting Range, Inc., 364 S.C. 242, 612 S.E.2d 462 (Ct. App. 2005).


If Frank could prove Dennis knowingly engaged in conduct he understood to be reckless/dangerous, it could reduce Dennis’s potential recovery in South Carolina.


Takeaway:

While Reynolds v. Reynolds: The Cereal Defense may have been a comedic take on the law and courtroom procedure, it offers a valuable insight on several topics in civil litigation. The series features several episodes with overtly legal topics and can be used to illustrate a variety of lessons across both civil and criminal law. In a future blog post, I'll discuss how the Gang's antics could be their undoing if faced by the right plaintiff's lawyer.


Contact Us:

If you have questions about the topics addressed in this article or another civil litigation matter, contact Wood Law Offices, PLLC through our website or by phone.


Disclaimer:

This blog post is for general informational purposes only and should not be construed as legal advice. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author. This content is considered attorney advertising and does not establish an attorney-client relationship. For specific legal advice tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney licensed in your jurisdiction.


Sources, For the Curious (or Skeptical):

  • Davis v. Banks, 40 N.C. App. 415, 253 S.E.2d 417 (1979).
  • Cook v. Winston-Salem, 241 N.C. 422, 85 S.E.2d 696 (1955).
  • White v. Dickerson, Inc., 248 N.C. 723, 104 S.E.2d 113 (1958).
  • Carrigg v. Cannon, 347 S.C. 75, 552 S.E.2d 767 (Ct. App. 2001).
  • Edwards v. Bloom, 246 S.C. 346, 143 S.E.2d 614 (1965).
  • Miller v. FerrellGas, L.P., 392 S.C. 295, 709 S.E.2d 85 (Ct. App. 2011).
  • Davis v. Hulsing Enters., LLC, 370 N.C. 455, 809 S.E.2d 320 (2018).
  • Presnell v. Payne, 272 N.C. 11, 157 S.E.2d 601 (1967).
  • Outlaw v. Johnson, 190 N.C. App. 233, 660 S.E.2d 550 (2008).
  • Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991).
  • McWilliams v. Parham, 269 N.C. 162, 152 S.E.2d 117 (1967).
  • Gilreath v. Silverman, 245 N.C. 51, 95 S.E.2d 125 (1956).
  • Fagundes v. Ammons Dev. Grp., 261 N.C. App. 138, 819 S.E.2d 436 (2018).
  • Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime, 333 S.C. 71, 508 S.E.2d 565 (1998).
  • Cole v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co., 362 S.C. 445, 608 S.E.2d 459 (2005).
  • McCune v. Myrtle Beach Indoor Shooting Range, 364 S.C. 242, 612 S.E.2d 462 (Ct. App. 2005).
  • “Reynolds v. Reynolds: The Cereal Defense.” It’s Always Sunny in Philadelphia, created by Rob McElhenney, season 8, episode 10, FX Productions, 6 Dec. 2012.


Intellectual Property Notice:

It’s Always Sunny in Philadelphia and all associated characters, episode titles, and trademarks are the property of FX Networks, LLC. Any references or commentary on the series, its episodes, or its characters are made solely for educational and informational purposes and are without prejudice to the rights of the original owners and creators. Neither the author of this article nor Wood Law Offices, PLLC is affiliated with, endorsed by, or connected to FX Networks, LLC or the creators of It’s Always Sunny in Philadelphia.


This blog post constitutes free public commentary on fictional legal scenarios for the purpose of legal analysis and public discourse. Such use is protected under the fair use doctrine in 17 U.S.C. § 107, which expressly covers “criticism,” “comment,” and “education.” See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986).


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